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ABSTRACT: The paper presents a numerical investigation on the failure of a micropile wall 
that collapsed while excavating the adjacent ground. The main objectives are: to estimate the 
strength parameters of the ground; to perform a sensitivity analysis on the back slope height 
and to obtain the shape and position of the failure surface. Because of uncertainty of the 
original strength parameters, a simplified backanalysis using a range of cohesion/friction pairs 
has been used to estimate the most realistic strength parameters. The analysis shows that 
failure occurred because overestimation of strength and underestimation of loads.  
Keywords: numerical analysis; FEM; ground failure; micropiles; retaining walls; back 
analysis 
1. Introduction  
A temporary micropile retaining wall with anchored tiebacks, which had been embedded in 
the ground before the excavation of an underground parking garage, collapsed after about 
40% of the excavation had been completed [1]. The parking garage was a new addition to an 
old building that was being rehabilitated. Its construction required an excavation to an average 
depth of 16 m from the existing ground level, involving a total surface area of about 1400 m2. 
Because of limited space for the parking garage between the old building and an amusement 
park it was not possible to safely slope the excavation sides. For that reason, a temporary 
retaining wall was needed before the actual excavation of the ground.  The procedure is 
sketched in Figure 1: first the temporary wall would be constructed embedded in the ground 
without much disturbance to the surroundings, then the excavation would start on one side of 
the wall and the tiebacks put in place.  The excavation would continue by stages until 
reaching the required depth. This is a rather common technique for deep foundations of 
retaining systems which can be constructed using precast or cast-in-place diaphragm walls, 
bored piles or micropile systems of several types (secant, tangent, discontinuous). This 
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technique first appeared in the 1950s [2] and has been developed and used in the past half-
century not only for excavations but also for slope stabilization, ground improvement, 
underpinning of monuments, rehabilitation of historical structures, seismic retrofit, etc. [3-
16].  The behaviour and failure of embedded or anchored in situ retaining walls has been 
extensively investigated as well in recent years [17-25]. A satisfactory performance of this 
type of structures requires sufficient knowledge of the geometric, topographic, hydrologic and 
geologic characteristics of the site, and of the material properties of the ground. 
The original design of the case presented in this paper, specified a bored pile wall to 
stabilize the grounds of the adjacent amusement park. However, shortly before the 
construction began the design was changed to a micropile wall. This micropile wall 
eventually failed during the excavation.  
After the failure, doubts were raised regarding several aspects of the construction 
process: ground characterization, design, construction issues and worthiness of the 
micropile/tiebacks system, effect of changing water conditions, etc. as possible causes of the 
failure. 
Analysis of the construction logs and visual inspection of the site, especially the part of 
the wall that remained intact after failure, brought consensus between property, contractor and 
external consultants, that the construction of the micropile/tiebacks system had been properly 
executed according to design specifications. This was further justified with a in-situ load test 
performed by an independent contractor on a newly cast micropile of the same type used in 
the failed wall. This load test showed that the pile performed well within the strength 
parameters specified in the design. 
Also in question was the true position of the water table at the moment of failure, since 
there was evidence from precipitation records and instrument readings in the area that the 
water table could be located near the surface after intense rainfall. However, records of 
rainfall accumulation during the days preceding the collapse show that rain episodes on those 
days were minimal. Seepage induced from leakage of a nearby water tank is considered 
irrelevant because the small volume of water involved could not significantly change the 
position of the water table. Therefore, it seems unlikely that the water table had moved to 
near-surface levels at the time of the wall’s failure and, in any case, the micropile wall that 
had been constructed was in essence “discontinuous” and consequently completely permeable 
during this temporary construction stage. Water pressures on the wall would then be 
automatically cancelled. Similarly, seepage forces were unlikely to play a significant role if 
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the water table was not near the surface. If that had been the case, the seepage regime would 
have been quite complex and further study would be needed. Finally, assuming that the water 
table did not change its position in the days preceding the failure, there could be no reduction 
of effective stresses and loss of shear strength because loss of suction [26-29] as the degree of 
saturation increases. 
After ruling out poor construction techniques and water effects as direct causes of the 
failure, there remained ground characterization (both geotechnical parameters and 
topography), and design of the wall based on the information available about the site 
conditions as main suspects. These were the issues left to further investigate the causes of 
failure and establish proper responsibility. It was decided to perform a numerical analysis to 
simulate the failure process with the design ground topography and with the actual ground 
topography, to establish the most likely failure scenario and to determine the quality of the 
ground parameters used in the design.  
The numerical analysis had to provide answers to the following: (a) whether the wall 
could fail with design strength and with design topography; (b) whether the wall could fail 
with design strength and with actual topography; (c) if the answer to the previous questions 
was negative, repeat the analysis with the actual topography and with a range of strength 
parameters of smaller values than the design ones, until failure was reached. The strength 
parameters for which failure is predicted are the most likely actual strength parameters of the 
ground. The numerical analysis also provides the shape and position of the failure surface. 
It will be shown that the failure of the micropile wall can be attributed to a poor and 
incomplete knowledge of the ground’s geotechnical properties and a lack of detail of the 
topographic data (see Figure 3 and Figure 4) which led to an overestimation of strength and 
an underestimation of the loads carried by the wall and tiebacks. 
2. Location and geological data 
The location where the failure occurred is a hill near Barcelona, Spain. It has an irregular 
rounded triangular shape (Figure 2), with a total surface area of approximately 6000 m2. The 
topography is determined by its location near the top of a hill which is at the SE end of the 
coastal range that runs approximately parallel to the coast and is formed by a sequence of 
low-height ranges. The lithology units outcropping in the range are the oldest in the area, 
consisting mainly of meta-sedimentary Palaeozoic rocks, especially dark slates, and hornfels 
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and phyllites as a result of the contact metamorphism produced by the presence of a granitic 
batholith, currently outcropping at the foothills. 
Within the plot limits the rock mass consists mainly of fractured slates of poor quality, 
with an RMR [30, 31] between 21 and 29. This rating would already suggest preliminary 
estimates of the strength parameters of about 𝑐" ≈ 10 − 20 kPa and 𝜑" ≈ 15* − 25*, much 
lower than those used in the original design. However, these values may be only crude 
approximations to the actual values. For instance, using Hoek & Brown’s failure criterion 
[32] the strength parameters are 𝑐" ≈ 15 kPa and 𝜑" ≈ 35*. These are still lower than the 
values used for the original design, but perhaps closer to the actual values, as will be shown in 
the following sections. 
3. Description of the failure 
Laboratory and field data were limited.  For design purposes one sample was taken for 
laboratory testing. That sample, however, may not have been representative of the material 
near the failed wall because it had been taken from a considerable distance (35 m) from that 
zone.  Based on that sole laboratory test, the geotechnical report gave the values of the 
strength parameters 𝑐" ≈ 50 kPa and 𝜑" ≈ 44*.  
In the original design no topographic survey was conducted outside the property 
boundaries, assuming incorrectly that the ground surface extended horizontally into the 
amusement park (Figure 3 and Figure 5). Because of that, the lateral pressure on the micropile 
retaining wall was assumed to be caused only by the 5 m of earth surcharge left after 
excavating to the plane of the micropile heads. However, the actual topography outside the 
property boundaries, seen in a topographic survey conducted after the collapse (Figure 4), had 
an uphill back slope with an actual height of 10 m, instead of the 5 m assumed in the original 
design. 
The temporary micropile wall consisted of 10.5 m-long continuous steel pipes of 114.3 
mm in diameter and 7 mm of wall thickness, filled with mortar without reinforcing bars, 
designed for shaft resistance only. The elastic limit of the pipes was approximately 550 MPa 
and the yield strength approximately 600 MPa. Mortar strength was 20 MPa. Each micropile 
had a compressive strength of 1129 kN, and a bending strength of 28.4 kN´m. There were 
two micropiles per meter of wall, for a total bending strength of 56.8 kN´m/m.  To stiffen the 
wall, a reinforced concrete cap beam was constructed joining the heads of the micropiles at 
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surface level. Figure 5 shows a typical cross-section used in the plane-strain analysis. Local 
datum is at elevation +486.83 m a.s.l., two meters below the head of the micropiles. The 
initial ground level was located at elevation +493.83 m a.s.l., from which 5 m were excavated 
to reach local reference +2.00 (+488.83 m a.s.l.), head of the micropiles. After the micropiles 
and the cap beam were in place, excavation started from that level and when it reached level 
+1.00 (+487.83 m a.s.l.), the upper row of anchored tiebacks was installed. Failure occurred 
approximately when the excavation reached level –3.00 (+483.83 m a.s.l.), approximately 5 m 
below the cap beam. 
Figure 6 shows a picture of the area where the excavation was being made and where 
the collapse occurred (at the right of the picture).  Figure 7 shows a general view of the failure 
area. An intact portion of the wall with the cap beam can be seen on the left of the picture. 
The failed portion is at the right of the image where the new slope created by the sliding 
ground is clearly visible. Figure 8 shows a partial view of the failed zone where parts of the 
broken piles and cap beam can be seen scattered on the ground surface. The conditions of the 
zone immediately after the failure were not preserved intact after it occurred, because swift 
action was taken by the contractor to clean the area. Therefore, there was only limited graphic 
documentation. However, verbal description given by the personnel working in the 
construction site suggested that most of the tiebacks failed due to excessive tension, while 
some were pulled out with the wall as it moved laterally with a rotation and translation 
motion.  
With this limited preliminary information, the most likely failure mechanism is 
illustrated in Figure 9, in which it is assumed, as suggested from a simple analysis using 
Blum’s method [33], that when a plastic hinge develops in the micropile because the bending 
moment exceeds its bending strength, the load on the tieback is still less than its yield limit. 
Step (a) in this figure shows the initial condition in which the back slope surcharge acts as a 
load without contributing to the strength. With this conditions, when the bending moment on 
the micropile exceeds the yield moment, step (b), a plastic hinge forms, releasing the 
confinement of the earth behind the retaining wall so that the earth pressure is applied only to 
the less deformable elements: the tieback and the embedment. At this time the ground behind 
the wall has failed and has no apparent cohesion. The earth pressure is then transferred mostly 
to the tieback thus increasing its load until it reaches the yield limit of the steel cables, step 
(c). After that, failure of the tiebacks and of the micropile happens immediately, step (d), with 
the consequent collapse and sliding of the ground towards the existing excavation surface. 
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4. Numerical analysis 
The results of this work come from two numerical analyses. The first one has been carried 
with the commercial code PARATIE™ [34], a FEM-based nonlinear computer code specific for 
flexible earth-support structures. The second analysis has been conducted with a general-
purpose FEM code, DRAC [35] that has been used to carry a nonlinear plane-strain analysis. 
The main objectives of the numerical analyses have been: (a) determination, by means 
of a simplified backanalysis described later, of the most likely strength parameters of the 
ground; (b) evaluation of the influence of the height of the back slope on the lateral pressure 
on the micropile retaining wall; (c) determination of the most likely ground failure surface; 
and (d) to explain the reasons why the micropiles failed. 
The numerical analysis was conducted using a Mohr-Coulomb constitutive model. 
Because of the uncertainty about the actual strength parameters, the analysis was conducted 
using several combinations of the strength parameters (𝑐", 𝜑"), each chosen in a range within 
reasonable upper and lower bounds. The objective was to determine the (𝑐", 𝜑") pairs that 
would not lead to failure. This provides an estimate of the boundary in the 𝑐"– 𝜑" space (see 
Figure 10)  between the values of strength that lead to failure and those that do not, thus 
giving an estimate range of the actual strength properties of the ground that have to be on this 
boundary, since it is known that the wall did fail. The strength parameters used in the design 
of the micropile wall (𝑐" ≈ 50 kPa and 𝜑" ≈ 44*) were obviously overestimated and 
therefore the actual strength parameters had to be less than those values. The lower bounds 
have been fixed at 𝑐" = 0 kPa and 𝜑" = 20*.  In total, 36 (𝑐", 𝜑") pairs have been used (Table 
1). The combination of parameters used in the original design corresponds to sets H6 (in 
service state: 𝑐" = 0, 𝜑" = 44*) and H36 (during construction: 𝑐" = 50 kPa, 𝜑" = 44*). The 
material properties of steel and concrete have been assumed deterministic with the values 
used in the original design. The rest of the parameters of the rock mass are taken with average 
values common in the area, and are the same for all (𝑐", 𝜑") pairs (Table 2). 
The first numerical analysis with the computer code PARATIE™ [34] has been performed 
to evaluate the loads acting on the wall (bending moment, shear forces), its lateral 
deformation, and the loads on the tiebacks. PARATIE™ is a nonlinear finite element code for 
the analysis of flexible retaining walls during multiple construction phases. Several 
components can be activated and/or removed during the analysis, such as anchors, struts, 
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fixed or flexible supports, external loadings, etc. If relevant, water table and seepage forces 
may also be included. This computer code performs the numerical analysis with the following 
premises: (a) the problem is assumed to be plane-strain: degrees of freedom are lateral 
displacements and out-of-plane rotations; vertical movements are automatically linked, and 
therefore the axial forces on the wall are not computed; (b) the flexible wall is simulated by a 
series of vertical beam elements; (c) the earth pressure can be applied on both sides of the 
wall (active or passive), and it is simulated by a double layer of elasto-plastic springs 
connected to the nodes on the wall; and (d) the sustaining elements (tiebacks, anchorages, 
struts, etc.) are simulated by springs applied to nodes on the wall. 
The response of the wall is obtained after numerical simulation of the construction 
sequence including construction of the wall, excavation and installation of the rows of 
tiebacks. All phases reproduce as accurately as possible the contractor-supplied load history 
of the structural elements. The sequence is as follows (note that steps 6 and 7 were never 
reached during the actual execution of the wall): 
1. Application of the pressure from the back slope.  
2. Excavation of 1 m, to level +1.00, and construction of the upper row of anchored 
tiebacks. 
3. Excavation of 1 m, to level 0.00 
4. Excavation of 1 m, to level –1.00 
5. Excavation of 2 m, to level –3.00 (actual failure occurred during this step) 
6. Excavation of 2 m, to level –5.00, and construction of the lower row of anchored 
tiebacks. 
7. Excavation of 2.15 m to level –7.15 
Knowing that failure did occur, and that it happened after approximately 5 m of 
excavation, it is possible to estimate the range of the actual, or most likely, (𝑐", 𝜑") pairs from 
the results of the numerical analysis, by recording the (𝑐", 𝜑") combinations for which the 
finite element analysis indicates that failure has been reached, or else for which the method 
does not converge in one of the construction steps (lack of convergence is an indicator of 
near-failure conditions). 
To investigate the sensitivity of the failure on the back slope height which was incorrect 
in the original design, the previous seven-step construction sequence was applied with two 
values of back slope height: 10 m (the actual value) and 5 m (original design), for comparison 
purposes and also to evaluate how sensitive to these variable are the failure conditions. The 
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results show that to reach failure as it happened, the strength parameters must have been 𝒄" ≈𝟎 kPa and 𝝋" ≈ 𝟐𝟓𝐨 − 𝟑𝟎𝐨 for the actual 10 m height, and  𝒄" ≈ 𝟎 kPa and 𝝋" ≤ 𝟐𝟎𝐨 for the 
incorrect 5 m used in the design. In both cases the estimated values of the strength parameters 
are much lower than the ones used in the original design (𝒄" = 𝟓𝟎 kPa, 𝝋" = 𝟒𝟒𝐨). With 
these parameters failure could not have happened even with the actual back slope height. The 
results also indicate that with 5 m of back slope height the failure could not have happened 
with reasonable values of the strength parameters in the range indicated above.  
Therefore, the actual back slope height of 10 m and dry soil (because water did not play 
a significant role) have been adopted to analyse the failure with the 36 (𝑐", 𝜑") pairs with 
ranges defined in Table 1. Figure 10 shows the limiting envelope of these (𝑐", 𝜑") pairs 
considered in the failure analysis.  Pairs outside the shaded area do not lead to failure and 
therefore cannot be the actual strength parameters since failure did happen.  This shows that 
the design strength was largely overestimated, since the (𝑐", 𝜑") pair used in the design is well 
outside the shaded area. The results suggest that the strength parameter sets that most likely 
represent the in situ conditions are H3 or H9 (Table 1), with 𝑐" = 0 or 10	kPa respectively, 
both with 𝜑" = 30*.  
The failure conditions of the tiebacks were also analysed. The tiebacks were made of 
steel cable with a load capacity of 150 kN per cable. Each tieback on the upper row consisted 
of two cables, with a total load capacity of 300 kN. With a separation of 3 m, the total 
admissible force on the tiebacks, per unit length, was 100 kN/m. Figure 11 shows the 
predicted load on the upper tieback row at the end of the construction for each (𝑐", 𝜑") pair in 
Table 1, with the C1 load setup. This figure shows how the load is higher with lower strength 
parameters, since then the lateral pressure on the wall is much larger. The figure shows also 
that there are only six (𝑐", 𝜑") pairs for which the load on the tiebacks remains below 100 
kN/m during all construction steps, including those that were never executed because the wall 
failed before: H24 (30 kPa, 44º), H29 (40 kPa, 40º), H30 (40 kPa, 44º), H34 (50 kPa, 35º), 
H35 (50 kPa, 40º) and H36 (50 kPa, 44º).   
Figure 12 shows the value of the load on the same row of tiebacks at the end of step 5, 
which was the last actually executed and during which failure occurred. Note that for some of 
the (𝑐", 𝜑") pairs failure happens before reaching this step. Considering only the construction 
steps that were actually executed before failure (step 5), the load on the tiebacks remains less 
than 100 kN/m with four more (𝑐", 𝜑") pairs: H18 (20 kPa, 44º), H23 (30 kPa, 40º), H28 (40 
kPa, 35º) and H33 (50 kPa, 30º). These latter (𝑐", 𝜑") pairs are outside the range considered 
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most likely. Therefore, since for the remaining (𝑐", 𝜑") pairs the load on the tiebacks is larger 
than the maximum admissible, it may be concluded that at the time of failure the load on the 
tiebacks was larger than its yield strength, and the cables were fully in the plastic regime. 
The second numerical analysis has been carried with the computer code DRAC [35], a 
general purpose finite element system developed specifically to perform analysis of 
geotechnical engineering problems. DRAC is a nonlinear code allowing 2D and 3D analysis, 
and includes zero thickness interface elements used in solving soil and rock mechanics 
problems to simulate discontinuities and contact surfaces. Also available are rod elements, 
used in the simulation of anchorages, tiebacks and struts. For the current analysis, a 2D finite 
element model in plane strain has been developed (Figure 13).  
Computations have been performed for each of the (𝑐", 𝜑") pairs in Table 1 with the 
primary purpose of finding the most likely failure surface linked to the previous numerical 
analysis, and also to support the results described before. The analysis with code DRAC has 
not been carried out, however, to the fullest extent possible with the code, because a three-
dimensional analysis of the wall and foundation mass would be necessary to fully understand 
the conditions of failure. However, this would not be justifiable for the objectives of the 
investigation in this case because of the computational cost involved.  
The sequence of excavation and construction of the micropiles and tiebacks has been 
simulated in 8 numerical steps, graphically described in Figure 14, with the C1 load setup. 
The numerical steps do not necessarily coincide with the construction steps defined 
previously. Thus, numerical step 1 (Figure 13) is the generation of the whole finite element 
mesh and the assigning of the initial stresses at the integration points. Although failure 
occurred when excavation reached the depth corresponding to numerical step 7, the analysis 
has been carried out to the end of the described sequence, except when prevented by lack of 
convergence, an indicator that failure conditions were reached. 
The numerical model is made of 1809 nodes, with 3261 triangular and 33 quadrilateral 
linear elements to simulate the rock mass, 73 interface elements to simulate the contact 
between the micropile wall and the ground, and two rod elements to simulate the two rows of 
tiebacks. The mesh is denser near the micropile wall, where failure is expected to occur. The 
rock mass is modelled with a Mohr-Coulomb material law, with the cohesion and friction 
angle corresponding to each of the (𝒄", 𝝋") pairs in Table 1. The rest of the material 
 10 
parameters are given in Table 2. For simplicity, and because lack of actual data, K0 prior to 
excavation has been assumed to be 0.5 in all cases. 
The tiebacks were simulated by rod elements, fixed at their ends to the wall elements 
and to the rock mass. For simplicity, no interaction between the rod elements and the 
surrounding material is modelled. The rod elements, as well as the elements representing the 
wall were modelled with a linear elastic material law. 
In general, the results obtained from the finite element analysis with DRAC are in good 
agreement with the results from the analysis with PARATIE™. Especially illustrative are the 
results showing the plastic deformation contours (Figure 15), which can be used to locate the 
position of the failure surface, and the deformed mesh (Figure 16), showing the curvature of 
the deformed micropile wall, a qualitative measure of the existing bending moments. High 
values of plastic deformation indicate the zones where the material has reached its yield limit. 
When this zone with high plastic deformation extends to a large volume, it indicates that the 
material has reached a global collapse condition. Figure 15 shows the extent of the plastic 
zone at the end of numerical step 7 for some selected  (𝑐", 𝜑") pairs. The figure shows that for 
low values of cohesion and friction angle, the volume of the plastic zone is large indicating 
that the ground behind the micropile wall has failed completely, whereas this volume 
decreases when the values of these parameters increase. In particular, for the values of c′ and 
φ′ used in the original design of the retaining wall (𝑐" = 50 kPa and 𝜑" = 44*, respectively, 
set H36) no significant plastic zone develops during excavation. 
The main conclusion of the numerical analysis using codes PARATIE™ and DRAC is that 
if the actual strength parameters had been the ones used in the original design, failure would 
never have occurred. Failure requires that the actual strength parameters be significantly 
lower, in the range obtained from this analysis. 
5. Discussion 
The two main issues investigated with the numerical analysis, regarding the failure of the 
wall, are the strength of the rock mass and the back slope height. It seems likely that the water 
table was deep and therefore did not play a role in the failure. The construction process did 
follow adequately the design specifications and therefore poor construction techniques were 
ruled out as possible cause of failure.  Comparing the results obtained in this work with the 
original design, the following points can be made: 
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5.1 Strength parameters of the rock mass 
The geotechnical report on which the original design was based specified zero cohesion and a 
friction angle of 44º. This was based on a laboratory analysis of a single sample taken from a 
depth of 2.3 to 2.6 m, about 35 m from where the wall would be constructed. 
It seems rather risky to have adopted, as representative of all materials, the values 
obtained from a single sample taken at a considerable distance, since the geological and 
geotechnical characteristics are very different: the sample used for testing was a clayey gravel 
(GP-GC) with a natural water content of 6% and a dry density of 20 kN/m3, while the rock 
mass in the failure zone consists of slates with a natural water content of 0.05% and dry 
density of 26 kN/m3. It seems unlikely that the strength of the latter material was the same as 
the one used in the laboratory tests. It seems also risky to have taken values as high as the 
ones in the original design, even for a temporary wall, without taking into account relevant 
warnings issued in the geotechnical report about using those values with caution. 
The present analysis shows that for dry material failure requires the strength parameters 
to be 𝑐" ≈ 0 kPa and 𝜑" ≈ 25* − 30*. The friction angle is considerably smaller than the 
value used in the original design and the cohesion is almost zero, compared with the 50 kPa 
assumed in the original design. With this latter value of cohesion, the numerical analysis 
predicts that failure conditions are never reached. 
5.2 Lateral pressure on the wall due to the back slope surcharge 
The original topographic survey did not provide information of the topography beyond the 
property limits. Because of that, the ground surface in the original project was assumed 
horizontal with a back slope height of 5 m. After failure, a new topographic survey, that 
covered the zone of the amusement park beyond the property limits, showed an uphill back 
slope with a height of 10 m, double of what was assumed in the design. The numerical 
analysis shows that with a back slope height of 5 m and using 𝑐" = 0 kPa and 𝜑" = 30*, the 
safety factor on 𝜑" ranges from 1.2 to 1.5 depending on the presence or not of water in the 
ground. 
6. Summary and conclusions 
Numerical analysis using the Finite Element Method has been used to determine the causes 
and mechanisms that lead to the failure of a temporary micropile retaining wall during 
excavation and to estimate the actual strength of the rock mass by means of a simplified 
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backanalysis. A sensitivity analysis has also been carried on the back slope height. The main 
conclusions can be summarized as follows: 
1. The main cause of failure was the overestimation of the rock mass strength. The friction 
angle used in the design was about 50% larger than the most likely value suggested from 
the present analysis. The cohesion (50 kPa) was also largely overestimated, since 
laboratory tests provided a near-zero value for that parameter. The present study shows as 
well that the most likely value for the cohesion was near 0 kPa. In general, failure appears 
to be more sensitive to the friction angle than to cohesion. 
2. A second cause of failure was the underestimation, during design, of the lateral loads on 
the wall. The reason was an incomplete topographic survey that did not extend beyond the 
property limits, and lead to an underestimation of the back slope height. Therefore, the 
loads on the tiebacks were also underestimated and the tiebacks failed because the 
transmitted loads were larger than their design yield strength. After failure of the tiebacks, 
the wall rotated and translated pulling out the remaining tiebacks that did not fail 
previously, and triggered the motion of the ground behind the wall. If the strength of the 
rock mass had been correct, this underestimation of loads probably would have had no 
consequences, according to the results of the present work. However, it did have an impact, 
since the actual strength was much lower than the one used in the original design. 
3. The events described in this paper and the subsequent finite element analysis demonstrate 
that knowledge of reliable ground properties as well as of good geometric and morphologic 
ground characteristics is crucial for sound design of geotechnical structures. Failure to 
obtain this information through sufficient testing and surveying is bound to lead to failures 
such as the one described in this paper with considerable economic losses, and in the worst 
cases with possible injuries or fatalities, which imply far more expenses than the savings 
for not carrying an extensive investigation campaign before the design stages. 
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 Figure	1.	Schematic	sequence	of	the	excavation:	a)	execution	of	the	micropiles;	b)	and	c)	intermediate	stages	including	excavation	and	execution	of	the	tiebacks;	d)	final	state.	Figure	2.	Sketch	of	the	area	showing	the	original	position	of	the	collapsed	wall.		Section	AA′	is	shown	in	Figure	5.	Figure	3.	Topographic	map	(detail)	used	in	the	design	of	the	micropile	wall.	The	survey	did	not	include	the	adjacent	property	(to	the	West),	thus	incorrectly	showing	a	horizontal	surface	(at	+494.00	m)	beyond	the	property	limits.	Figure	4.	Topographic	map	(detail)	from	the	new	survey	performed	after	the	collapse,	showing	the	true	topographic	surface	in	the	adjacent	property,	the	original	location	of	the	failed	micropile	wall	(thick	line	from	top	left	to	bottom	right)	and	the	position	of	the	failed	elements	after	collapse.	Figure	5.	Typical	cross-section	used	in	the	analysis	(AA′	in	Figure	2)	Figure	6.	View	of	the	excavation	zone	before	the	wall	was	initiated.		The	location	of	the	failure	is	on	the	right	of	the	image.	Figure	7.	View	of	the	collapsed	wall.	The	intact	part	of	the	wall	with	the	cap	beam	can	be	seen	on	the	left,	and	the	failed	part	on	the	right.	Figure	8.	Detail	of	the	failed	wall.	Parts	of	the	broken	piles	and	cap	beam	can	be	seen	scattered	on	the	ground	surface.	Figure	9.	Collapse	mechanism:	(a)	initial	conditions;	(b)	a	plastic	hinge	forms,	arching	occurs	behind	the	wall	and	the	ground	cannot	resist;	(c)	lateral	deformation	of	the	pile	begins	with	the	tieback	within	its	strength	limit;	(d)	large	lateral	deformation	and	failure	of	the	tieback	and	pile.	Figure	10.	Limiting	envelope	of	strength	parameters	combinations	leading	to	failure.	Figure	11.	Predicted	load	on	the	upper	tieback	row	at	the	end	of	construction	for	all	strength	parameters	combinations	analyzed.	Missing	points	indicate	failure	before	reaching	this	stage.	Figure	12.	Predicted	load	on	the	upper	tieback	row	at	the	end	of	construction	stage	5	when	the	actual	collapse	occurred.	Missing	points	indicate	failure	before	reaching	this	stage.	Figure	13.	Initial	(step	1)	finite	element	mesh	used	with	DRAC	Figure	14.	Excavation	sequence	with	DRAC	(step	numbers	refer	to	the	numerical	analysis,	not	to	the	construction	sequence)	Figure	15.	Extent	of	the	plastic	zone	obtained	with	DRAC	near	the	micropile	wall	after	step	7	for	the	selected	sets	of	strength	parameters	indicated	Figure	16.	Deformed	mesh	obtained	with	DRAC	near	the	micropile	wall	after	step	7	for	the	selected	sets	of	strength	parameters	indicated	(magnification:	100Í)	
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 Table 1. Definition of combinations of strength parameters used in the analysis 
       
c' 
φ' 
0 kPa 10 kPa 20 kPa 30 kPa 40 kPa 50 kPa 
20º H01 H07 H13 H19 H25 H31 
25º H02 H08 H14 H20 H26 H32 
30º H03 H09 H15 H21 H27 H33 
35º H04 H10 H16 H22 H28 H34 
40º H05 H11 H17 H23 H29 H35 
44º H06 H12 H18 H24 H30 H36 
 
 
 
Table 2. Fixed material parameters 
Parameter Value 
Steel elasticity modulus, Es 2.1 × 105 MPa 
Concrete elasticity modulus, Ec 2.5 × 104 MPa 
Virgin modulus of rock, Ev 30 MPa 
Unloading/reloading modulus of rock, Eur 50 MPa 
Dry specific weight of the rock above the 
top of the micropiles, γd1 
20 kN/m3 
Dry specific weight of the rock below the 
top of the micropiles, γd2 
24 kN/m3 
K0 coefficient 0.5 
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Figure 1. Schematic sequence of the excavation: a) execution of the micropiles; b) and c) 
intermediate stages including excavation and execution of the tiebacks; d) final state. 
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Figure 2. Sketch of the area showing the original position of the collapsed wall.  Section AA′ 
is shown in Figure 5. 
  
1
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Figure 3. Topographic map (detail) used in the design of the micropile wall. The survey did 
not include the adjacent property (to the West), thus incorrectly showing a horizontal surface 
(at +494.00 m) beyond the property limits. 
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Figure 4. Topographic map (detail) from the new survey performed after the collapse, 
showing the true topographic surface in the adjacent property, the original location of the 
failed micropile wall (thick line from top left to bottom right) and the position of the failed 
elements after collapse. 
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Figure 5. Typical cross-section used in the analysis (AA′ in Figure 2) 
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Figure 6. View of the excavation zone before the wall was initiated.  The location of the 
failure is on the right of the image. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7. View of the collapsed wall. The intact part of the wall with the cap beam can be 
seen on the left, and the failed part on the right. 
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Figure 8. Detail of the failed wall. Parts of the broken piles and cap beam can be seen 
scattered on the ground surface. 
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Figure 9. Collapse mechanism: (a) initial conditions; (b) a plastic hinge forms, arching 
occurs behind the wall and the ground cannot resist; (c) lateral deformation of the pile begins 
with the tieback within its strength limit; (d) large lateral deformation and failure of the 
tieback and pile. 
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Figure 10. Limiting envelope of strength parameters combinations leading to failure. 
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Figure 11. Predicted load on the upper tieback row at the end of construction for all 
strength parameters combinations analyzed. Missing points indicate failure before reaching 
this stage. 
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Figure 12. Predicted load on the upper tieback row at the end of construction stage 5 when the 
actual collapse occurred. Missing points indicate failure before reaching this stage.  
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Figure 13. Initial (step 1) finite element mesh used with DRAC 
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Figure 14. Excavation sequence with DRAC (step numbers refer to the numerical analysis, 
not to the construction sequence) 
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Figure 15. Extent of the plastic zone obtained with DRAC near the micropile wall after step 7 
for the selected sets of strength parameters indicated 
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Figure 16. Deformed mesh obtained with DRAC near the micropile wall after step 7 for the 
selected sets of strength parameters indicated (magnification: 100Í) 
